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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LEARNING TO SWIM: A LAW STUDENT’S INTRODUCTION TO
FUNCTIONAL THINKING IN TORTS

NATHANAEL R. BERNEKING*
When I was asked to write an essay for the Teaching Torts issue of the
Law Journal, I reacted with a great deal of reservation. As a law student who
has never taught anything law related, I am far from an expert in any field,
including torts. In fact, I am still hesitant to put anything on paper related to
“teaching.” Instead, this essay will focus on “learning” torts. It is my hope
that this provides professors with insight into the student’s mind and further
assists them in their pursuit to provide better legal education.
PART I: INTRODUCTION
My own experience with learning torts began on my first day of law school
at Saint Louis University. My professor1 began the course with an appropriate
simile. He stated that law school was like being thrown into a swimming pool
in an effort to learn how to swim. At first, the student has trouble just staying
afloat in the sea of discussion and legal doctrine. An instructor might be there
to give a helping hand, but the student must quickly begin to learn rough and
rudimentary strokes. Eventually, with some work, the student learns to better
refine the strokes and can begin to feel his or her way around the pool walls.
Finally, after years of work, one can explore the pool with efficiency and gain
an understanding of how the various parts come together to form a whole.
That is, only after a great deal of work, does any student learn that various
fields link up to form the whole of “the law.”

* J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law.

I would like to thank the editorial
board and staff of the Saint Louis University Law Journal for this opportunity. A law student is
fortunate to have a single article published while in law school. I am forever grateful for a second
publication.
1. In addition to Torts, I have had the good fortune to take a number of classes with
Professor John Griesbach. Under his direction, I gained a greater understanding of torts,
administrative law and legal philosophy. In addition, my understanding of the law was greatly
expanded as a result of a summer fellowship under his direction. I apologize in advance for any
mistakes, misunderstandings or misstatements in this essay. They are the result of my own
shortcomings as a student, not Professor Griesbach’s.
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A class in torts focuses on the strokes necessary to learn the torts part of
the pool.2 My own experience has convinced me that Torts is also the best
means to learn an important stroke or tool for understanding and practicing the
law in general: functional thinking.
In the initial months, and perhaps for the entire first year, law students lack
the ability to think functionally. My own notion was that law school would
teach doctrine, which could be applied to any number of factual scenarios.
Some of my classmates continue to hold this belief. They shutter at any
professor that strays from blackletter law into the realm of functional thought.
To their detriment, these students missed the mark. My Torts professor was
the first and most effective in presenting a functional approach to torts and the
law in general during my own legal education.
Part II of this essay will present a definition of “functional thinking.”3
Next, Part III will provide some examples of functionalism at work in torts.4
The essay will conclude that, without learning this approach early, students
have a difficult time comprehending the intricacies of more complicated fields
such as conflicts of law and contracts.5 Further, Torts provides ample
opportunity to describe this approach to new law students.6
PART II: THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
I was introduced to functional thinking early in my legal education.
However, I lacked the ability to formulate exactly what it entailed. That is, I
understood how to think functionally,7 but had trouble comprehending exactly
what it was. Again my Torts professor came to the rescue, but not in Torts. In
2. To clarify, when the word “torts” is capitalized it refers to a specific class taught by
faculty members at an institution of legal education. When “torts” is not capitalized, it refers to
the field of law in general.
3. See infra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. Although credit will be given during this
discussion, I feel a need to provide the reader with an early qualification. None of the examples
are original. That is, I have borrowed all of them from my notes from my first year torts class.
The same examples may be found in other authorities as well.
5. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
6. However, Torts does not provide the only opportunity. In fact, a similar style of
teaching is advocated by our distinguished faculty member here at Saint Louis University School
of Law, Professor Vincent Immel, in an article on teaching Contracts. See Vincent C. Immel, Use
of the Contracts Courses as a Vehicle for Teaching Problem Solving, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1205
(2000). Professor Immel approaches legal education through a heavy emphasis in problem
solving. See id. Such problems require a functional approach. Professor Immel insists that it is
not enough to conclude that a promise has been made. One must go beyond that and explain why
the particular facts involved require the conclusion. See id. at 1207. Students learn functionalism
through these problems.
7. This assertion should not be taken to mean that I mastered the approach. On the
contrary, I still struggle to “think like a lawyer.” I presume that mastery of the approach does not
come with efficiency for many years.
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a class on legal philosophy,8 he introduced the students to the American Legal
Realists. Most notably, we read excerpts from Oliver Wendell Holmes9 and
Felix Cohen.10 Together, these two giants of jurisprudence provided me the
tools to comprehend both the “how” and “what” of functional thought.
Holmes laid the groundwork for the functional approach by describing law
as “prophecies of what the courts will do in fact.”11 Then Cohen finished the
job. He argued that legal concepts cannot be defined using purely legal
terms.12 Such reasoning leads to a “vicious circle” of transcendental
nonsense.13 Instead, one must resort to asking what courts will do in fact.
That answer may rely on psychology, social fact, custom and moral
persuasions or prejudices.14
With these tools in hand, the concepts of fair value, due process and a
corporation’s location disappear.15 These concepts, rather than explaining why
a court ruled in a certain way, become patterns of behavior. Cohen wrote,
“The ghost-world of supernatural legal entities to whom courts delegate the
moral responsibility of deciding cases vanishes; in its place we see legal
concepts as patterns of judicial behavior, behavior which affects human lives
for better or worse and is therefore subject to moral criticism.”16
I do not intend to advocate legal realism. Rather, the functionalist
approach has paved the way for each positivistic approach in the twentieth
century. Without functional thinking, Ronald Dworkin could not have defined
law as a holistic pattern of decisions of policy and principles.17 Neither could
Richard Posner argue that the economic markets dictate legal decisions.18
Cohen himself stated that “[i]t would be unfortunate to regard ‘functionalism’
in law as a substitute for all other ‘isms.’ Rather, we must regard
8. The class was simply called Jurisprudence. The material was split between theories of
natural law and legal positivism, and the material on the syllabus covered everything from
Aristotle to Richard Posner and Arthur Allen Leff.
9. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
10. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809 (1935).
11. Holmes, supra note 9, at 461. However, it is also clear that this approach to the law
would not have been possible without the insight of Wesley Hohfeld. Hohfeld’s Fundamental
Legal Concepts of right, duty, no-right, privilege, power, disability, immunity and liability form
the basis for functional thinking. See Walter Wheeler Cook, Hohfeld’s Contributions to the
Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721, 723 (1919).
12. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 814.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 816.
15. See id. at 813-21.
16. See id. at 828-29.
17. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
18. See RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997); Ronald Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). These are only two examples of the countless volumes
now covering the topic of law and economics.
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functionalism, in law as in anthropology, economics, and other fields, as a call
for the study of problems which have been neglected by other scientific
methods of investigation.”19
A functional approach to the law seems necessary for any attorney today.
It is no longer sufficient to look at a legal decision as the result of formalistic
doctrine. If the decision is to be used in a subsequent legal argument, the
lawyer must peel away the layers of formalism to discern why the decision was
made as it was. Such thinking was introduced in Torts, and a few examples
continue to capture my curiosity and fascination.
PART III: FUNCTIONAL THINKING IN TORTS
As a first year law student, I was immediately faced with functional
thinking. My professor emphasized throughout the class that the system must
be viewed as more than a system for compensating the loss of a single
individual. Rather, from a functional perspective, the torts system must be
viewed as regulatory. That is, judges make decisions that form a decentralized
regulatory system. Certain behavior is identified as bad or good and this
identification is reinforced through the award of damages.
The first cases in my casebook presented a broad overview of the tort
system.20 In fact, the first case in the book, Glick v. Olde Town Lancaster,
Inc.,21 provided the first dose of functionalism in Torts. In this case, the
plaintiff was raped in an abandoned and boarded up building owned by the
defendant, Olde Town Lancaster, Inc. The court held that the defendant had
not been negligent and the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. The case
appeared to be a formal look at sections 323 and 324A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which cover the liability for injuries to third persons for
negligent performance of an undertaking. As a first-year student, I remember
feeling very comfortable with this formalistic read of the case. The plaintiff
simply did not meet all the elements of the Restatement provision.
Fortunately, no one in the class was allowed to remain comfortable.
Instead, we were questioned as to why we thought the defendant was not
held liable. Most of the class seemed to think that Olde Town should have
been liable. After all, its property had been abandoned. This contributed to the
rape of the plaintiff. Others, thinking with extreme formalism, thought that
Olde Town should not be liable because the plaintiff was unable to fit her case
within the Restatement provisions.

19. Cohen, supra note 10, at 829.
20. JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 2-21 (2d. ed.
1997).
21. 535 A.2d 621 (1987), app. denied, 548 A.2d 255 (1988), reprinted in PHILLIPS, supra
note 20, at 2-6.
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After a great deal of wrangling, the professor explained that the first
element of a tort case is “duty.” However, he urged us not to look at duty as
something owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Rather, it should be viewed
as a question of whether the plaintiff has the power to sue in tort. If the
plaintiff has the power, then the defendant is liable to that action.22 The
professor then generally explained if one does not affirmatively act, a person
injured by the non-feasance will not have a power to sue. In Glick, Olde Town
had committed non-feasance by allowing its property to fall into disrepair, not
malfeasance. Thus, Glick had no power to sue and Olde Town was not liable,
or put another way, Glick was disabled from suing in tort and Olde Town was
immune.23
The explanation did not stop with this description of the case. The
Hohfeldian concepts merely paved the way for a functional explanation of the
case. Simply stating that the court held for Olde Town because it had
committed non-feasance says little about the case. The questioning turned to
“why” such a rule was used. That is, rather than explaining the courts action
using purely legal concepts, the professor demanded something outside of the
law. He first had the class describe the judicial behavior and then also forced
us to explain why the court might have behaved in such a way. This was our
first introduction to functional thought.
A number of possible reasons for the “no duty for non-feasance” rule were
suggested, most at the urging of the professor. For instance, the court may
have been guarding against tort law driven socialism. That is, if one could be
held liable for inaction, then there was little to prevent the courts from
transferring wealth. In this particular case, the court may have been protecting
Olde Town because it owned a building that could not be restored nor sold
without a severe loss under the relatively recent changes to tax law. In
addition, it had become very difficult to prevent criminals and recently deinstitutionalized homeless people from breaking into abandoned buildings.
Olde Town could have done little outside of selling the property to avoid this
incident. In a system intended to regulate people’s behavior, such liability
makes little sense.
The professor explained that any or none of these explanations may have
played a role in the court’s decision. However, he also emphasized that law
students and attorneys must be able to use functionalism to explain the law as
it is handed down by courts and legislatures. Glick seemed well-suited to

22. “Power” and “liability” are two of Hohfeld’s jural correlatives. A “power” is the ability
to change a legal relationship. If one has a power, then some other person must have a correlative
liability vis-à-vis the one holding the power. See Cook, supra note 11, at 725.
23. Again, Hohfeldian concepts are extremely helpful in explaining the court’s actions.
Because the court refused to grant Glick the power to sue, that “power” was replaced by its jural
opposite, a “disability.” The jural correlative of disability is “immunity.” See id. at 726-27.
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introduce functional thought, and the professor continued this approach
throughout the semester.
Even in traditionally formalistic issues, functional thought provides insight
into the law. For instance, my torts casebook laid out the elements for battery
in a case styled Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc.24 In that
case, a woman was injured at the defendant’s skating rink. Believing her arm
to be broken, an employee of the rink decided to set the broken bone, rather
than calling for medical assistance. Such action fulfilled each of the elements
of battery. The defendant’s employee intentionally caused a harmful or
offensive contact with the plaintiff.25 For these reasons, the court held for the
plaintiff.
This could have ended the class time devoted to the case. The elements of
battery had been explained by reference to the facts of the case. However, the
professor pressed ahead with a more functional approach. This time, he asked
the class whether the same result would have been reached if the plaintiff and
the defendant’s employee had been in an isolated canyon, and the plaintiff
could not have climbed out of the canyon without the bone being set. The
same contact would have occurred. Under a purely formal approach, the
defendant should again be liable. However, under a functional approach,
holding the defendant liable for the action in the canyon would make no sense.
If one assumes the tort system is regulatory, the defendant’s conduct could not
be identified as “bad” behavior. In the skating rink, medical professionals
could have been consulted. Thus, setting the arm was considered “bad,” while
identical behavior in an isolated canyon must be identified as “good.”
Therefore, a different result must be reached.
Other examples could be provided, but they would add very little to the
essay. I do not intend to list each and every instance of functionalism
contained in my notes from torts class. Rather, I only wish to demonstrate how
Torts can be an effective means of showing new law students how to think
functionally and why such an approach has advantages throughout a legal
career.
PART IV: OTHER USES FOR FUNCTIONAL THOUGHT
Functionalism is important from the outset of one’s legal education.
Without it, many issues cannot be solved with credibility. Formal rules of
consideration provide descriptions of a court’s action, but they do little to
explain why the court has decided to enforce one promise and not enforce
another. Most of my fellow students had little difficulty memorizing the rule
that “a peppercorn” is sufficient consideration or that an enforceable promise
required a “bargained for exchange.” However, we all struggled to understand
24. 82 A.2d 458 (1951), reprinted in PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 20, at 39-41.
25. Clayton, 82 A.2d at 462.
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why a court enforced one promise and not another.26 The problem was that we
had not yet grasped the idea of functional thinking.
In the world of conflict of laws, resort to territorialist rules27 may hold
great appeal, but often lead to strange results. New approaches ushered in
during the twentieth century forego formalistic rules in favor of functional
analysis.
Brainerd Currie propounded the governmental interest analysis, which
requires one to discern the interest of each state involved in a conflict
problem.28 State interests are derived from the purpose behind each state’s
respective law. Such purpose might be found in legislative history, but it is
more likely that one must understand the function of the conflicting laws to
discern a state interest.29 A state law may function differently than it was
originally intended.30 Thus, modern conflict of laws problems require
functionalism for there to be any hope in arriving at a solution.
A final example of the importance of functionalism can be found in the
realm of contracts. In an article about unconscionability, Judge Irving
Younger wonderfully described the doctrine.31 Formally, there must be
inequality of bargaining positions or gross unfairness, but as a first-year law
student, I was rather perplexed when he concluded that much of his own
analysis of a case was subjective. He looked for something that shocked his
conscience.32 Such epiphanies are frustrating for the first-year law student

26. See Peter Linzer, Consider Consideration, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1317 (2000). Linzer
noted that most of us begin with a rather formalistic notion of consideration, one that “seems to
exist mostly to be set up and knocked down again.” Id. at 1318. In fact, students often think they
understand why courts enforce a promise, but when pressed they often provide circular answers
such as, “because there was (or was not) consideration” or the slightly more developed “because
there was (or was not) a bargained for exchange.” Such circular and conclusory logic is difficult
for students to avoid, and without a dose of functionalism early in their legal education, their
answers as attorneys will be no better.
27. SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE,
INTERNATIONAL 16-37 (1998). Such was the approach of early American courts. See id.
28. For an excellent summary of governmental interest analysis, see CHEATHAM ET AL.,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 477-78 (5th ed. 1964), reprinted in SYMEONIDES, supra note 27, at 112-13.
29. In fact, it is entirely possible that courts are more interested in achieving the “right”
result, rather than discerning the true policy behind a law. See id. at 119.
30. For instance, some states may adopt a guest statute. A guest statute is a law that
prohibits a passenger in a car from recovering damages from the driver for injuries sustained in an
accident where the driver was at fault. Other states may allow the passenger to recover. When
two such laws come into conflict, the interest of each state must be discerned under Currie’s
approach. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963), reprinted in SYMEONIDES,
supra note 27, at 121-27.
31. Judge Irving Younger, A Judge’s View of Unconscionability, JUDGE’S J., Apr. 1974, at
32-33.
32. See id.
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trying to make sense of case law, the Socratic method and the mountain of
blackletter law that we all assumed needed to be put to memory.
After three to four semesters, I finally realized that the key to these
examples was functional thought. Slowly, I began to recall my professor’s
approach to Torts. First, we would review what the court said. But then, and
more importantly, we discussed what the court was doing. More often that not,
the discussions were not the same, but the second discussion is imperative in
solving legal problems.
PART V: CONCLUSION
In describing law school, second and third year students describe a “light
bulb” coming on sometime during the first or second year of law school. In
this way, they attempt to explain how it is they come to understand the thought
process required of law students and attorneys. Unfortunately, I think a “light
bulb” is a misdescription. Instead, my own experience was more like a light
attached to a dimmer switch.
In Torts, my professor turned the switch to the on position by constantly
requiring his students to think functionally. In his own words, he was throwing
us all into the pool in an effort to teach us to swim. Slowly, over time, other
professors continued to move the switch to a brighter and brighter position. At
some point, which is impossible to pin down, enough light was cast to allow
one to make out the shape of the law. One might say that at this point, the
student begins to make his or her way around the edges of the pool.
Rudimentary strokes are learned.
Without functionalism, real solutions to legal problems are impossible.
While reviewing an early draft of this essay, someone asked why I thought
students had trouble with functional thought. This is an extremely difficult
question, and the answer probably varies with each student. Generally, I think
two reasons account for the vast majority of problems. First, students, while
willing to put in thousands of hours of reading and study time, do not want to
address the difficulties of a new way of thinking. As I said before, many of my
peers groan when a professor leaves the safe confines of blackletter law and
factual scenarios. They show even less enthusiasm when they are called upon
to try their hand at problem solving and functional thinking.
Second, functional thinking is difficult to convey. It seems to me that
functionalism requires the student to learn by doing. Thus, class discussion
seems to be the best means. Unfortunately, students are often of the mindset
that they have little, if anything, to learn from their peers. In my own
experience, I find class discussion tedious because so much of the information
provided by other students is misstated or ineffectively communicated.
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However, such problems can be remedied by the student’s own careful
preparation33 and by a professor who insists on careful and accurate analysis.34
In the ideal setting, well-prepared students learn the requisite problem
solving skills and functional thought through a heavy dose of lecture and class
discussion. In such an environment, functional thought becomes second
nature. It sheds light on cases and doctrines that seem illogical or nonsensical.
With the broad array of fact patterns and legal doctrine, Torts is an ideal place
to introduce functionalism.
I am grateful to my Torts professor for doing so. My strokes are still rough
and rudimentary, but without his help I could never have started to make my
way around the pool.

33. For these reasons, I, unlike most of my classmates, prefer a professor that does not go
alphabetically or in groups when calling on students for answers. A “shotgun” or “cold-calling”
approach forces students to stay prepared throughout the semester. See Douglas L. Leslie, How
Not to Teach Contracts, and Any Other Course: Powerpoint, Laptops, and the CaseFile Method,
44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1289, 1298-99 (2000).
34. I should also note that I have had many professors opt for lecturing over the Socratic
Method. While such an approach is often frowned upon by legal academia, see, for example,
supra note 33, at 1295, many of these lectures have been extremely effective in communicating
the necessary legal analysis. It also allows for a much broader range of coverage and prevents the
class from becoming stuck on a single topic for too long.
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